



At least since the time of the early church fathers, there have been universalist Christians who held that all human beings will eventually be redeemed.  There have also been those who, while denying universal salvation, nevertheless modify the concept of hell in various ways, either by construing it as a less horrendous separation from God or as simple annihilation.  I will not survey each of these options, but rather focus on the traditional concept of hell as a place, or perhaps a state of being, in which the unredeemed undergo extreme and everlasting suffering.   Indeed, it is striking how such a ghoulish and surreal conception of the afterlife has been taken for granted in some Christian circles.  But ghoulish and surreal it is, and before engaging in a limited evaluation of this doctrine,  it might be well to stop and consider the character and extent of the horrors that are thought to constitute the eternal fate of the damned.  At least, it would be useful to do this if we could, but I doubt human imagination is sufficient to grasp an eternity of suffering.  This, of course, has not stopped preachers from engaging it lurid descriptions.  Consider this nugget from Jonathan Edwards: 
 “It would be dreadful to suffer this fierceness and wrath for even one moment; but you must suffer it to all eternity: there will be no end to this exquisite, horrible misery: when you look forward, you shall see a long forever a boundless duration before you, which will swallow up your thoughts, and amaze your soul;  and you will absolutely despair of ever having any deliverance, any end, any mitigation, any rest at all…” ​[1]​  

Even allowing for hyperbole (and it’s not clear Edwards intends any hyperbole), the place described by Edwards is a very bad place indeed.
But while hell presents a moral problem for all Christians who endorse the doctrine, there are also particular problems that arise depending on how one conceives of God’s relationship to the world.  For example, anyone who holds that God  pre-determines the post-mortem fate of the saved and the lost will have a much more difficult time defending the moral legitimacy of hell that, for example, those who advocate open theism.​[2]​  In this paper I want to consider how the traditional conception of hell fares if we approach it from the standpoint of a currently popular view of God’s foreknowledge and providence, the Molinist account.

1. Molinism
	According to many Christians, God is in complete providential control of everything that happens in the world.  Such control is understood as absolute, including both deterministic natural phenomena and creaturely choices.   Because God has such control, we can be certain that God’s purposes for the world will be fulfilled, not just in general terms, but with respect to each and every detail of the entire history of the universe.  This conception of divine providence has been aptly characterized by Thomas Flint:
Being Omniscient God, God has complete and detailed knowledge of this world—its history, its current state, and its future.  Being omnipotent, God has complete and specific control over the world, a world which has developed and will continue to evolve in accord with his sovereign and never-failing will.  Being omnibenevolent, God has used his knowledge and power to fashion and execute a plan for his world that manifests his own moral perfection and the inexhaustible love he bears for his creation. According to this traditional picture, then, to see God as provident is to see him as knowingly and lovingly directing each and every event involving each and every creature toward the ends he has ordained for them.​[3]​
	An immediate worry that comes to mind when we consider this strong view of divine providence is that it seems to conflict with the belief in free will, at least if we understand such freedom in a libertarian, as opposed to compatibilist, sense.  By “libertarian freedom,” I mean the sort of freedom that involves not just freedom from external control, but also freedom to control one’s own choices and decisions.  While compatibilists have typically held that a person is free if they can act on the basis of their choices without external restraint, libertarians hold that a necessary condition for choice being free is the choice itself is not completely determined.  As the name implies, compatibilists hold a person can be free and yet have their decisions totally determined (be it by God or natural causation), whereas libertarians hold that true freedom requires that one’s choices are themselves undetermined.  Given the assumption of libertarian freedom, the problem can be crystallized as this:  if God has control over the entire history of the world, including, for example, my decision to drink another cup of coffee right now, then it seems it is God, not me, that is really in control of my choice and I am not really free.  Some Christians, notably Calvinists, are happy to endorse this consequence of a strong conception of divine providence for free will.  But for the majority of Christians such theological determinism is deeply troubling.  For one, the Calvinist doctrine contains within it the seeds of a devastating argument from evil against the existence of God.  For if God is responsible for each of our choices, it follows that God is directly responsible for both the huge number of evil actions that human beings have committed over the years, and, more troubling still, the eternal fate of each creature.  While proponents of Calvinistic predestination are happy to defend this consequence of their view of divine sovereignty, many others find the God imagined by such Calvinists a barbaric caricature of the biblical God of love.​[4]​  Even if we set aside this theological difficulty, theological determinism shares with its naturalistic cousin the difficulty of seeing how any creature can be really morally responsible for his or her actions.  This is not the place to discuss this controversy in detail.  In what follows I will simply assume the position that wherever the truth may lie, in cannot be found in theological determinism.  Instead I propose to consider in depth whether one way philosophers have tried to reconcile strong divine providence with libertarian free will   While this approach, known as Molinism, has its roots in the scholastic philosophy of  the 16th century, it also has many recent defenders.​[5]​  In particular, I will examine whether Molinism provides a conception of divine sovereignty that is morally and logically consistent with the belief that God’s plan includes the eternal suffering of the damned. 
	How is this reconciliation to be accomplished?   It is here that Flint and others refer to the distinctive contribution of the 16th century Jesuit theologian, Luis de Molina.  Molina’s understanding of divine providence is complex, but we may begin to understand his view by means of a contrast with another view of God’s relationship to the total history of the universe, a view we can call simple foreknowledge.  According to simple foreknowledge, God, in virtue of being omniscient, has exhaustive knowledge of everything that happens, past, present, and future.  My choice to drink another cup of coffee today is, to the mind of God, just as well known as the two cups of coffee I have drank previously.  Thus the simple view of foreknowledge preserves the traditional belief that God has exhaustive knowledge future events. Nothing is hidden from the mind of God.  But on this view God’s knowledge is limited to what will actually occur. God knows what will actually come about in the actual world that God creates.  In contrast to this Molina, argued that God’s knowledge, prior to creation, is much more extensive.  God does not just know what I will, in fact choose to do; God knows what I would choose to do in any circumstance.  Thus, God knows that were I writing a paper in a coffeehouse (as I am now doing), I would freely choose to drink coffee.  He also knows that in other circumstance, circumstances that will not in fact obtain, I would make other choices. In fact God knows what I would choose in any possible circumstance I am placed in.  Nor is this knowledge limited to persons that God actually chooses to create.  According to Molina, God knows what any possible person would freely choose to do in every possible circumstance in which such a person could be placed. 
 It is clear that from the standpoint of strong divine providence, this Molinist view has several advantages over simple foreknowledge.  For while the simple foreknowledge view gives God exhaustive knowledge of how the history of the world will play out, it is unclear how such knowledge gives God any insights that may be useful in providentially governing the world.  In brief, God’s knowledge of what will take place happens “too late” for God to do anything about it.  Suppose it is part of God’s providential plan that I do not drink Coffee this afternoon.  If this is so then how does God’s knowledge that I will drink coffee help God fulfill God’s purposes?  For if God knows that I will drink coffee, then I will drink coffee.  There is nothing God can do about it.  Simple foreknowledge, far from giving God resources for controlling how the world will turn out, rather presents God with a fait accompli that God can do nothing about.​[6]​  Even if this worry about simple foreknowledge can be countered, it is still clear that Molinism provides God with much greater resources for fine tuning the history of the world.  If God knows the counterfactual  truth, “were I placed in a coffee house Jan 5 2009, I would choose to drink coffee” as well as all the other counterfactual truths about what I would do in other circumstances,  then God can place me in situations that are best suited to fulfill God’s plans. If God wants me to drink coffee, God can place me in a situation in which I would choose to drink coffee.  If God does not want me to drink coffee, God can place me in other circumstances in which I do not make that choice.  And so on with respect to any decision I, or any other possible creature, may make.  On the other hand, God’s knowledge of these  so-called “counterfactuals of freedom” limits the sorts of worlds that God can create.  For on the Molinist account what a possible creature would freely choose to do is totally independent of God’s will.  God knows what I would choose to do, but God cannot change the fact that in a certain circumstance, I would make a particular choice (assuming God does not violate my freedom).   So if God wants me to drink coffee and there are no possible situations in which I would choose to drink coffee, God is out of luck.  Likewise, it may be that there is a situation in which I drink coffee, but that this situation includes other factors God that are inimical to God’s plan.  Maybe the only situation in which I drink coffee is one in which I am also being tortured, for example.  In this way counterfactuals of freedom are similar to logically necessary truths.  Just as God cannot create a world in which there is a round square, so too God cannot create a world in which I freely drink coffee if the counterfactuals of freedom are such that I never would make such a choice.  This is why Molina called knowledge of these counterfactuals “middle knowledge.”  Logically speaking, these truths that God knows are known after his knowledge of necessary truths, yet prior to his free knowledge of how the world will actually turn out (this last knowledge is “free”, because it depends on God’s free decisions in creation) 
	The Molinist view, if coherent, therefore provides a way of retaining a libertarian theory of the will along with strong divine providence.  This is one of the advantages of the theory.  Another advantage, first noted by Alvin Planting, is that Molinism allows us an elegant defense against the anti-theistic argument from evil. This argument claims that there is logical inconsistency between:




(2) There is evil.

The reasoning is familiar. If God is good God would want to create a world without evil. If God is omnipotent then God is able to create a world without evil.  But there is evil, ergo, there is no God.  A traditional response to this argument has been to appeal to free will.  God cannot be blamed for the evil done by creatures because it is us fallen mortals, not God, who bears the ultimate responsibility for evil.  To this defense J.L Mackie has retorted that God, being omnipotent, can create any possible world, including the possible world in which free creatures freely chose not to do evil.  But, again, there is evil. So God does not exist.​[7]​  It is at this point that Plantinga, who had not yet heard of Molina, invoked a remarkable Molinist-style defense. Very briefly, Plantinga’s approach is to simply point out that if the truth value of counterfactuals of freedom are not dependent on God’ will, there is no way for even an omnipotent God to make a creature freely choose one way or another.  The best God can do is place free creatures in circumstances in which their choices will be most conducive to God’ plan.  One cannot, in other words, claim that God’s omnipotence and goodness necessitates that God create the best possible world for, on the Molinist account, there are possible worlds that are not feasible for God to create.  These are worlds that violate no necessary truths, but which God cannot create because of certain brute truths about the choices free creatures would make.  In fact, Plantinga argues it may be that no free creature is such that it will never freely commit a serious moral wrong no matter what situation it is placed in. Thus, the goodness of free will provides the theist with a counter to the ant-theistic claim that evil and God existence are logically incompatible​[8]​.  
2.  Hell 
As we have seen, one prime reason for rejecting the Calvinist conception of providence is that it seems to present an intractable problem of evil.  For while one may present a serious moral challenge to any variety of Christianity that allows for Hell, the challenge becomes even stronger if the decisions on which God judges creatures are themselves dependent on the will of God.  We have also seen that unlike Calvinism, Molinism provides an apparent way to allow for strong providential control without denying libertarian free will.  Molinism has also been thought useful by many in developing ways of countering the atheological argument from evil.  Now the question comes: how does Molinism square with what is, for those who endorse it, the most difficult problem of evil, the problem of reconciling the belief in a good and loving God with the eternal suffering of the unredeemed in hell?  We can easily see why someone may think Molinism is preferable to Calvinism on this score.  For the Molinist explicitly endorses a robust libertarian view of free will. Those who go to hell do so because of their own choices and decisions, not because God has forced them to do so. This is the approach explicitly endorsed by William Lane Craig.​[9]​  Craig takes  Plantinga’s molinistic free will defense one step further,  arguing that not only finite evil, but also the horrendous suffering of Hell can be accounted for in a morally acceptable manner if we accept the Molinist account of providence. 
	To understand Craig’s argument, we need to be clear about the specific moral problem he is concerned with.  Craig has no concern for the fate of those who “reject Christ,” for he sees these people as sealing their own fate through their free choices.  What concerns Craig are only those who through no fault of their own have never heard the gospel?  While Craig allows that some of these individuals may be redeemed through their response to “the light of general revelation” such people are few and far between.​[10]​  The problem, as Craig sees it, lies in the belief that there are some true counterfactuals of freedom.   Take any individual who has not heard the gospel in his lifetime, call him George.  George has not heard the gospel, yet it seems on the face of it possibly true that had he heard it, George would have been redeemed.  Yet, Craig insists that unless George is one of the very special people who respond to general revelation, George will be damned, even though he would have been saved if he had heard the gospel message.  Here is the ‘soteriological problem of evil.”   A good and loving God would want to save George.  An all powerful God would be able to save George. Yet, by hypothesis, George damned.  In this way either the existence of a good and loving God, or Craig’s strong variety of Christian exclusivism, is called into question.​[11]​
	It is worthwhile to emphasize that Craig understands this problem in an extremely narrow light. The problem only rises for those who have heard the gospel.  He has no concern at all for those who don’t agree with the truth of Christianity after having heard of it.  For these unbelievers, eternal damnation is the only to be expected from a just and holy God.  This limited understanding of the scope of the problem has several peculiarities. First, it ignores the apparent fact that there are people who sincere in their non-belief and also people who are sincere in their commitment to alternative religious traditions.  Gandhi, for instance, knew of Christianity but chose to remain committed to Hinduism.  For Craig, this is enough to show that Gandhi “rejected” Christ and thus deserves damnation? But in what sense does a sincere Hindu reject Christ? It would seem that in order to reject Christ, one must first believe that there is a Christ (that is, a risen Lord, not merely an historical Jesus).  But the most likely explanation of Gandhi and others who reject of Christianity is not that they believe in the cross and resurrection and then deny it. They are not like, the demons, who in the words of James, believe and tremble.  They simply don’t believe at all.  What Gandhi and others do is not reject God or Christ, but reject the truth of the central tenets of Christianity.  Perhaps sometimes such non-belief is a matter of self-deception. One may pridefully reject what one deep down knows to be true.  This may be the case sometimes, but it is hardly plausible as a blanket explanation for every case of a person deciding that they don’t believe that Christianity is true.  Suppose further that a thoughtful Christian is persuaded by an examination of the argument from evil that the Christian God does not exist.  We may disagree with the reasoning, but it is hardly plausible that God damns this individual for their thoughtfulness and yet blesses the naïve Christian for whom evil was never seen to be a problem.  Or consider the example of the person who hears the genuine gospel from preachers who themselves do not live it, who may even be physically or sexually abusive. It is a logical error to conclude, from the character of the messenger, that the message is wrong. But such a logical lapse is not a moral error, and certainly not the sort of error a loving God could not forgive.  To this we may add, in agreement with Marilyn McCord Adams, that concretely lived human life is full of innumerable contingent obstacles and dysfunctions that render human beings incapable of an informed choice that seals our eternal fate.​[12]​
	But even if Craig is mistaken about the scope of the problem his solution, if plausible at all, will work for many, if not all, of these cases.​[13]​  This solution is to attempt to apply Plantinga’s free will defense to the problem of hell.   Recall that Plantinga claimed that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom limited the kind of world that God could create.  While there is a logically possible world in which everyone is both free and yet does not sin, these counterfactuals may, for all we know, render such a world not feasible for God.  It may even be that there are counterfactuals of freedom that guarantee that whatever free creature God creates, they will inevitably sin; the inevitability here is not of God’s doing.  God does not make creatures sin. It is rather a brute fact about the free choices creatures would make. Armed with this Molinist conception of divine providence, Craig argues in a similar vein. Succinctly put, his argument is that it is possible that none of those who do not in their mortal lives hear the gospel would, in any possible circumstance, become converts to Christianity.   We cannot blame God for rigging the world so that many do not hear of Christ, because God knows that these people, no matter how much grace is bestowed on them, will never turn to God.  Just as Plantinga claimed it possible that all free creatures suffer from transworld depravity (they all would sin in any possible circumstance), so too Craig argues that it is possible that those who never hear the gospel suffer from transworld damnation.  And since these lost souls are lost through their free choices and not because of divine decree, God cannot be held morally accountable for their damnation.  Craig insists that God loves each individual and wants each to be saved; it just so happens that many of these people that God loves he also knew, from the beginning, would end up in hell.​[14]​

3. The Cannon Fodder View of the Unredeemed
	
	The first thing to notice in evaluation of Craig’s position is that the analogy between his approach and that of Plantinga is incomplete. For Plantinga, transworld depravity is a possible feature that all possible free creatures possess. Transworld damnation, on the other hand, is only possessed by the many that through the centuries have never had Christianity explained to them. Those who hear the gospel and respond to it are, obviously, not transworldly damned.  Likewise for those few who respond to “general revelation.”  Thus while Plantinga can argue that God could not create any world that both has free creatures and also is sinless, it appears this option is not possible for Craig.  If God could create a world in which all are saved, why didn’t he?
 Craig is aware of this difficulty and tries to respond it to it.  Craig allows that it is “obvious that, all things being equal, an omnibenevolent god prefers a world in which all persons are saved to a world containing those same persons some of whom are lost.”​[15]​  But, Craig insists, all things are not equal.  For it may be that in order to receive an “optimal balance” between the saved and lost, God must create many who are lost.  As Craig boldly puts it: “An omnibenevolent God might want as many creatures as possible to share salvation; but given certain true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, god, in order to have a multitude in heaven, might have to accept a number in hell.”​[16]​
Craig’s point is that whether or not a certain person responds to Christ will depend on contingent features of the world that person finds herself in.  These features will include facts such as that so and so is or is not a believer Christianity and whether he or she has heard of Christ.  Thus one cannot legitimately infer from the fact that there are, for example, one billion saved persons in this world along with huge numbers of unredeemed, that God could create a world which contained these redeemed persons alone, without the company of the transworldly damned.  As a matter of logic, Craig is surely correct. Just because A is feasible in circumstance B, it does not follow that A is feasible in circumstance C.  Furthermore, we may even allow that the claim has certain plausibility in some cases.  It may be that only by observing the tragic life of a contemporary that a person can be jarred out of the dogmatic slumber of petty materialism and respond to Christ.  But as a general claim about the relationship between saved and lost we must conclude that it is totally implausible. For the vast majority of those who Craig believes to be transworldly damned have, historically, had little contact with those who hear the gospel and have the opportunity to accept or reject it.  It is surely natural to suppose that if another person’s life is going to affect my fundamental life choices, I should at least be aware of such persons. Yet throughout much of history, such mutual awareness between would be Christians and those who have never heard of Christ just did not exist.  Craig may reply that there is nevertheless an indirect connection between, e.g. the population of China in 300 BCE and later Christian conversions, but without some plausible indication how such a connection can not only exist but also  be so significant as to alter substantially the ratio of saved to lost, the claim is incredulous.
But there is a deeper problem with Craig’s proposed eschatology. Recall that a chief reason for rejecting theological determinism is that such a belief, when combined with the belief that all are not saved, seriously calls into question the goodness and loving character of God.  Craig believes that by affirming the Molinist commitment to libertarian freedom, he is able to avoid this sort of devastating critique. But is this really so?  Does the bare allowance of libertarian free will, when coupled with Molinist providence, really reconcile the existence of a good and loving God with the existence of hell?  Let us compare the situation as Craig understands it with the analogous position of a theological determinist.  The determinist holds that God creates human beings of various sorts and in creating them determines that some will be damned, others redeemed.  Prior to the creation of the world, God knows what the end result will be.  God knows that many will spend eternity in hell because of God’s decree, and is, nevertheless, happy with this situation.  According to Craig’s Molinist alternative God also knows, prior to creation, that there will be a certain ratio between saved and lost. God knows that in creating many of God’s creatures, he is ensuring that they will spend eternity in hell. True, God does not causally determine the choices that lead to the damnation of these persons.  Nevertheless, the counterfactuals of freedom ensure that if these individuals are created, they will be damned.  Therefore, merely in the act of creation God is guaranteeing for many of God’s creatures an eternal life that is much worse than never having existed at all.  As Craig insists, God engages in elaborate Molinist fine tuning to ensure the best ratio of saved to lose.  On this Molinist scheme God does not force anyone’s decision, but this does not prevent God from being utterly manipulative in his attitude towards creation.   Let us allow that Bob would freely reject Christ in any possible circumstance.  Let us further allow, as Craig insists, that in such rejection, freely made, Bob is responsible for his own fate. Neither of these allowances justify Craig’s claim that a Molinist, damnation friendly deity can also consistently be viewed as good and loving towards each of God’s creatures.  For while in this example Bob is responsible, so too is God.  One does not, in general, lose all responsibility for an action just because it involves another person’s free choice.  If I knowingly give the keys of a car to Sally, who happens to be drunk,   I share a responsibility in the outcome, even though it was Sally’s free decision to drive while inebriated.  Likewise God, in creating person’s whom he knows will never accept Christ, shares a responsibility for the resultant suffering in hell. 
Consider also the strikingly consequentiality character of Craig’s conception of the deity.   God willing creates a certain number of people whom he knows will be damned so that in the end the result would consist in a greater number of damned.  How exactly this cost/benefit analysis works in the divine mind is naturally left a little vague.  It cannot be just that God aims at the best possible ratio of saved to lost, since Craig allows that it is likely there is some world that God could create which only contains the redeemed.  Yet Craig seems willing to admit that there is some sacrifice involved in creating people who will spend eternity in hell. What is important is that on Craig’s view God creates some persons who will be damned solely in order to allow that other people will be saved.
For many people this sort of approach to human lives, in which some are sacrificed for the greater good, is unacceptable even in the case human choices and decisions. It is this sort of attitude towards others, an attitude which sees other rational beings as tools to be used rather than as bearers of intrinsic value that underlies Kant’s famous moral dictum that we ought to treat others not merely as a means, but also as an end.  Yet if we focus simply on the human case, it is not obvious that sometimes we may not have to treat people in just this way.  While most of us cringe at the thought of a surgeon who kills one of his patients in order to give organ transplants to five others, those of us that are not pacifists must also allow that sometimes it may be necessary to sacrifice some for the sake of a greater good (e.g. the defeat of Hitler).  But even here it is a part of standard just war theory that such “collateral damage” is never to be specifically sought out. One may allow that non-combatants will die, but one cannot pick out specific civilians to directly kill as a means for achieving victory.  And yet, According to this Molinistic soteriology, this is exactly what God does in creation. 
In the human case, perhaps such an absolutist conception of the legitimate ends of action is naïve. Maybe there are cases in which it is permissible to directly cause the death of another for the sake of the greater good.  But even if we allow for this in the human case, it is not clear that such consequentialist justifications transfer over to the divine.  If I am in a situation in which I must kill one person to save the lives of 100, there is no way I can prevent the death of at least one person.   No matter what I do, a dreadful event will occur. Like many less dramatic cases in human life, I am forced to choose the lesser of two evils.  But God, prior to creation, is a very different situation.   God does not simply find himself placed, at no fault of his own, in a situation in which the circumstances demand that some be damned eternally to hell.  God specifically chooses to create world in which there not only is a hell that is full to the brim with suffering people.  Craig, to be sure, replies to this that these damned in hell are there through their own free choices. But, again, this does not eliminate the cold and manipulative character that Craig is compelled to impute to the Christian God of love.  We may say to a greedy person who loses a fortune to a con-man, that it was their own fault.  But this does not exculpate the criminal from responsibility. A factory owner who pays workers less than a living wage is exploitative, even if each of the workers freely chooses be employed in the factory.  When we think through all the cases in which a human being may be morally culpable for using another human being, the vast majority of such cases do not involve violating another person’s free will, but in treating a person’s free choices as way of satisfying some other end. The crucial ethical insight of Kant is not that it is wrong to make other people do something against their will, but that in our social relations with others we ought to treat them as having value for their own sake, and not merely as instruments to be used for ulterior ends.  Even if we allow that we must in some tragic circumstances use another merely as a means because the cost of not doing so is so great, we cannot apply that rationale to God.  The moral analogue to Craig’s God is not that of a person stuck in a situation in which there are no good options.  God, on Craig’s view, intentionally puts himself in such a no-win situation.  
Nevertheless, one might think it a mistake to saddle our creator with Kantian moral concerns. God is our creator, and what is wrong for us may not be applicable to the actions of that being whose responsibility involves the entirety of creation.  But we do not have to rely on the controversial claim that God is restrained by moral duties to show the incoherence of Craig’s soteriology.  For the same point can be made with even more force is we focus not how God ought to act towards us, but on God’s character as a loving God, a God who cares about the world and each of the creatures in it.  God’s love is understood to be akin, yet infinitely greater, than the love human parents have for their children.   Furthermore, God’s love is not merely a generalized love for the totality of creation; it is a particular love for each individual.​[17]​   While one can argue that a general concern for the goodness of creation justifies the creation of many destined to be lost, it is impossible to reconcile this claim with the belief that that God loves, individually, each of these people’s that he knows will go to hell.  From the standpoint of scripture, divine love is likened to parental love, only greater.  Even if we admit that human parental love has limitations, those limitations have little application to the much greater love of God.   No marginally decent human parent would ever intentionally conceive a child so that its organs can be used to save the lives of others.  To love is to value an individual for their own sake, to wish for the good of that individual. A loving God does not merely aim to create a good world, such a God is in a deep and significant loving relationship to each person, perhaps even each conscious creature, in that world.  God does not merely want to make a good world; God desires the good of each person in that world.   It may be controversial in particular circumstances what it is that really constitutes my or your good.  Certainly each of us can be mistaken about what the good is.  But whatever my good may be, an eternal existence consisting primarily of massive and unmitigated suffering, suffering that serves no remedial purpose, is not it. 
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